

























Dynamics of Output Growth, Consumption and Physical Capital 
















Department of Economics and Related Studies 
University of York 
Heslington 








Luigi Siciliani and Anderson Stanciole    Bargaining and the Provision of Health Services
Luigi Siciliani￿ Anderson Stancioley
20 August 2008
Abstract
We model and compare the bargaining process between a purchaser
of health services, such as a health authority, and a provider (the hos-
pital) in three plausible scenarios: a) the purchaser sets the price, and
activity is bargained between the purchaser and the provider: activity
bargaining; b) the price is bargained between the purchaser and the
provider, but activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider: price bar-
gaining; c) price and activity are simultaneously bargained between the
purchaser and the provider: e¢ cient bargaining. We show that: 1) if
the bargaining power of the purchaser is high (low), e¢ cient bargain-
ing leads to higher (lower) activity and purchaser￿ s utility, and lower
(higher) prices and provider￿ s utility compared to price bargaining. 2)
In activity bargaining, prices are lowest, the purchaser￿ s utility is high-
est and the provider￿ s utility is lowest; activity is generally lowest, but
higher than in price bargaining for high bargaining power of the pur-
chaser. 3) If the purchaser has higher bargaining power, this reduces
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1prices and activity in price bargaining, it reduces prices but increases
activity in activity bargaining, and it reduces prices but has no e⁄ect
on activity in e¢ cient bargaining.
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21 Introduction
Prospective payment systems are used widely to remunerate health care
providers. They usually take the form of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs)
pricing or similar methods, such as Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) in
the United Kingdom or Group Homogenes de Maladie (GMC) in France.
Depending on the institutional context, purchasers and providers bargain
on price, activity, or both. For example, in the US, Health care Mainte-
nance Organisations (HMOs) or private health insurers bargain on price,
and seldom activity, with the hospitals (Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2006;
Brooks, Dor and Wong, 1997). In the UK, Health Authorities and Primary
Care Trusts have been negotiating price and activity with NHS Trusts un-
der "cost and volume" or "sophisticated" contracts. The government has
recently implemented a policy known as "Payment by Results", where prices
are regulated, but activity is negotiated between the Primary Care Trust and
the NHS Trust. Within the Medicare Programme in the US, prices are cho-
sen by the purchaser (Medicare), while activity is either chosen or bargained
with the provider. Similar arrangements exist throughout Europe (Figueras
et al., 2005, p. 243-245; Le Grand and Mossialos, 1999, ch.1).
Although we observe a substantial amount of bargaining between pur-
chasers and providers, the theoretical literature on the relative merits of
prospective payment systems normally assumes that payers are able to set
the prices, and often activity, unilaterally, while providers choose the amount
of quality and cost-containment e⁄ort (see, for example, Ma, 1994; Chalkley
and Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b; Mougeot and Haegelen, 2005; De Fraja,
2000). This implies that purchasers have all the bargaining power, which is
a simplifying assumption, as the empirical evidence suggests that providers
3may hold at least some of it. Propper (1996) shows that in England pur-
chasers with higher bargaining power could secure lower prices. Brooks,
Dor and Wong (1997) estimate that US hospitals hold on average 65% of
the bargaining power when negotiating with private insurers. Melnick et al
(1992) ￿nd a negative association between purchasers with greater market
shares and prices charged by the providers.
This study models the bargaining process between a purchaser of health
services (a health authority) and a provider (a hospital) in three plausible
institutional settings: a) the purchaser sets the price (stage 1), and the ac-
tivity is bargained between the purchaser and the provider (stage 2): activity
bargaining; b) the price is bargained between the purchaser and the provider
(stage 1), and the activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider (stage 2):
price bargaining; c) price and activity are bargained simultaneously between
the purchaser and the provider: e¢ cient bargaining.
The ￿rst two models (activity and price bargaining) are two-stage mod-
els. For both models prices are decided before activity takes place. This
is a reasonable assumption. Prices are normally set at the beginning of
each ￿nancial year, before the hospitals start to treat the patients. In the
third model (e¢ cient bargaining), both prices and activity are decided at
the beginning of the ￿nancial year, and the model has then one stage only.
Our main objective is to compare prices, activity and the utility of
provider and purchaser in each of the three di⁄erent institutional settings.
We obtain three main results.
1) First, if the bargaining power of the purchaser is higher than a certain
threshold and the marginal bene￿t of activity is strictly decreasing, e¢ cient
bargaining leads to higher activity and lower prices compared to price bar-
gaining. As a consequence, the purchaser￿ s utility is higher under e¢ cient
4bargaining than under price bargaining, while provider￿ s utility is lower.
The results are reversed if the bargaining power of the purchaser is below a
certain threshold: the activity is higher and the price are lower under price
bargaining rather than e¢ cient bargaining. Therefore, the purchaser￿ s util-
ity is higher under price bargaining than under e¢ cient bargaining, while
provider￿ s utility is lower.
This result is surprising, as one would expect the purchaser to be better
o⁄ when she can bargain with both instruments, price and activity. This
intuition proves correct only when the bargaining power of the purchaser
is high. When it is low, the purchaser would be better o⁄ contracting on
prices only: having more instruments is not useful, and actually is counter-
productive. This is because when the bargaining power of the purchaser
is very low, the provider will bargain a very high price, which under price
bargaining will be accompanied by a large volume of activity. In contrast the
level of activity under e¢ cient bargaining is always determined such that
the marginal bene￿t of quantity is equal to the marginal cost, regardless of
the price: therefore under e¢ cient bargaining when the purchaser is weaker,
she will pay a higher price without obtaining any extra activity.
Interestingly, the threshold level of bargaining power of the purchaser
over which the purchaser is better o⁄, depends critically on the shape of the
marginal bene￿t curve. The threshold is higher when the marginal bene￿t
function is steeper (ie the bene￿t function is more concave) and when the
marginal cost function is ￿ atter (ie the cost function is less convex).
Also, the threshold is strictly positive only when the marginal bene￿t of
activity is decreasing: if the marginal bene￿t is constant (and equal to the
average bene￿t), the purchaser is always better o⁄ regardless of its bargain-
ing power (the threshold is zero in this case). Intuitively, this arises because
5if the marginal bene￿t is constant, activity is always higher under e¢ cient
bargaining than under price bargaining, while the price is the same.
Activity under e¢ cient bargaining is always determined such that the
marginal bene￿t is equal to the marginal cost. If the marginal bene￿t is
strictly decreasing and the purchaser has low bargaining power, activity
under price bargaining can be such that the marginal bene￿t is below the
marginal cost but the average bene￿t is above the price, so that the pur-
chaser￿ s utility is positive. If the marginal (and average) bene￿t is constant,
and the marginal bene￿t is below the cost, then the average bene￿t will be
below the price, which implies a negative utility of the purchaser, which can
never arise (as under Nash Bargaining both parties always end up with pos-
itive utilities). Therefore, the activity under price bargaining will be always
lower than under e¢ cient bargaining if the marginal bene￿t is constant.
2) Our second main result is that under activity bargaining, price and the
provider￿ s utility are lowest and the purchaser￿ s utility is highest. The level
of activity in activity bargaining is always lower than in e¢ cient bargaining.
It is also lower than in price bargaining, but only if the bargaining power
of the purchaser is below a certain value (which, according to our numerical
simulations is at least 0.59). If the bargaining power of the purchaser is high,
then the level of activity is higher under activity bargaining than under price
bargaining.
Even if activity is generally lower under activity bargaining, the lower
price more than compensates for the reduction in the bene￿t for the patients
from the lower activity, so that the purchaser is overall better o⁄. The
analysis therefore supports policies such as "payment by results" in the UK,
where prices are ￿xed by the purchaser or the regulator.
One less intuitive implication of our results is that by shifting from ef-
6￿cient and price bargaining (as in "cost and volume" or "sophisticated"
contracts) to activity bargaining (as in "payment by results"), the level of
activity is likely to decrease. This is in contrast to what is normally thought,
ie that "payment by results" will encourage activity. However, our results
are consistent with recent empirical evidence (Farrar et al., 2006) which
￿nds that the introduction of "payment by results" in 2003-2005 generally
did not lead to any subsequent signi￿cant increase in the volume of activity
in England.
3) Our third result is that under price bargaining, higher bargaining
power of the purchaser reduces prices and activity; in activity bargaining it
reduces prices, but increases activity; and in e¢ cient bargaining it reduces
prices but has no e⁄ect on activity. Therefore, when the bargaining power
of the purchaser increases, price and activity are positive correlated under
price bargaining, negatively correlated under activity bargaining; have no
correlation under e¢ cient bargaining.
The intuition for these results is the following. Under price bargaining,
the optimal activity is chosen by the provider such that the price is equal to
the marginal cost. Therefore, whenever the price increases, as a result of a
stronger purchaser, activity follows. Under e¢ cient bargaining, the optimal
activity is such that it maximises the sum of the purchaser and provider
utility. Since purchaser￿ s utility is given by the bene￿t minus the transfer
to the provider, while provider￿ s utility is given by the transfer minus the
cost, this is equivalent to maximise the di⁄erence between bene￿t and cost.
The optimal activity is chosen such that the marginal bene￿t is equal to the
marginal cost of activity, regardless of the bargaining power. Therefore, a
stronger purchaser will obtain a lower price but not a lower activity, so that
the correlation between activity and price is zero. Under activity bargaining,
7a stronger purchaser is able to agree with the provider a higher volume of
activity for a given price; if the marginal bene￿t of activity is decreasing, the
higher agreed activity reduces the marginal bene￿t for the purchaser from
￿xing a higher price, so that the price is lower and activity is higher when
the purchaser is stronger.
The above results are derived in sections 2 and 3 and focus on price
and activity only. In Section 4 we extend the analysis by adding quality
and cost-containment e⁄ort as choice variables of the provider. This makes
activity bargaining a three-stage model, and e¢ cient and price bargaining a
two-stage model. Cost-containment e⁄ort is always decided by the provider
in the last stage of the game, as realistically, e⁄ort takes place after the
negotiation stage, which is at the beginning of the ￿nancial year. We assume
that demand responds positively to quality. Therefore, the quality decisions
always happen when decisions on activity take place. This is because by
committing or deciding on a certain level of activity, indirectly the provider
commits as well to a certain level of quality.
We show that under this more general setting, the main results of the
analysis in terms of regime comparison still hold. The only di⁄erence is that
the marginal cost is now interpreted as the marginal cost and disutility of
activity and quality; similarly, the marginal bene￿t includes the marginal
bene￿t of activity and quality. For what concerns cost-containment e⁄ort,
since the provider is residual claimant in the three di⁄erent settings, e⁄ort is
always set such that marginal bene￿t from lower cost is equal to the marginal
disutility of e⁄ort, regardless of the institutional setting. Therefore, adding
e⁄ort to the analysis does not alter the main results.
This study contributes to the literature on purchaser-provider bargain-
ing in healthcare (for a recent survey see Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2006).
8Ellis and McGuire (1990) develop a model in which patients and doctors bar-
gain about the intensity of treatment, and derive the optimal combination
of patient￿ s insurance and reimbursement for the provider which maximises
consumer welfare.1 Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2005a) show that, when
bargaining with providers, purchasers may prefer to bargain with a profes-
sional association rather than a subset of more e¢ cient providers. Barros
and Martinez-Giralt (2000) analyse the bargaining process, in which the
purchaser can choose whether to negotiate with each provider separately or
jointly, or announce a contract that any provider is free to sign (the "any
willing provider" clause). They show that if the total surplus is high, the
purchaser prefers the system of "any willing provider", but if it is low she
prefers either joint or separate negotiations. Gal-Or (1997) shows that pur-
chasers (private insurers) might be willing to sign exclusive contracts with a
subset of providers in order to secure more favourable terms during bargain-
ing. Gal-Or (1999a) studies whether vertical mergers between hospitals and
physician practices might enhance their bargaining power with the insurers
(see also Gal-Or, 1999b). Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2005b) explore the
implications of the coexistence of a public and a private sector in the pro-
vision of health services. They argue that the public sector might choose
to hold idle capacity in order to extract more bene￿cial conditions when
bargaining with the private sector for the provision of services. There are
other applications of bargaining in the health economics literature. Clark
(1995) examines how to divide a budget between two patients with di⁄er-
ent health conditions and capacity to bene￿t. Pecorino (2002) models the
e⁄ects of drug reimports from Canada on the pro￿tability of US domestic
1Dor and Watson (1995) evaluate how di⁄erent payment mechanisms a⁄ect the incen-
tives in the relationship between hospitals and physicians.
9pharmaceutical companies.2
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
provides a comparison of the di⁄erent scenarios. Section 4 extends the model
by adding quality and cost-containment e⁄ort. Section 5 o⁄ers concluding
remarks and policy implications.
2 The model
We model the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services,
such as a health authority, and a provider (a hospital). De￿ne y as the
number of patients treated and p as the price the provider receives for each
patient treated. The provider￿ s utility U is given by its surplus U(p;y) =
py ￿ C(y), where C(y) is the cost function of the provider, which satis￿es
Cy > 0; Cyy > 0 (increasing marginal cost).
The purchaser￿ s utility (or health authority utility) is given by the dif-
ference between the bene￿t for the patients B(y) and the transfer to the
provider: V (p;y) = B(y) ￿ py. The bene￿t function satis￿es By > 0 and
Byy ￿ 0.3
We analyse three plausible scenarios. 1) Activity bargaining: the pur-
chaser sets the price (stage 1), and activity is bargained between the pur-
chaser and the provider (stage 2). 2) Price bargaining: the price is bargained
2See also Wright (2004) for a model of price regulation in the pharmaceutical sector
where the regulator and the pharmaceutical company bargain over a subsidy.
3A more general objective function for the purchaser is B (y) ￿ (1 + ￿)py + ￿U, where
￿ is the opportunity cost of public funds and ￿ is the weight attached to the utility of the
provider. The main results of the analysis with this more general speci￿cation would be
qualitatively similar as long as either ￿ > 0 or ￿ < 1. We therefore focus on the special
case where ￿ = ￿ = 0.
10between the purchaser and the provider (stage 1), but activity is chosen by
the provider (stage 2). 3) E¢ cient bargaining: price and activity are bar-
gained simultaneously between the purchaser and the provider.
De￿ne ￿, with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, as the bargaining power of the purchaser,
(1 ￿ ￿) as the bargaining power of the provider, V and U as the outside
options for the purchaser and the provider respectively, and e V = V ￿V and
e U = U ￿ U. For notational simplicity let V i = V (pi;yi);Ui = U(pi;yi),
where i = a;p;e denotes respectively activity, price and e¢ cient bargain-
ing. In all the sections below we use Nash bargaining to solve for optimal
conditions (Nash, 1950, 1953; Kalai, 1977; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990).4
2.1 Activity bargaining
In the ￿rst scenario, we assume that ￿rst the purchaser chooses the price
(stage 1), then the purchaser and the provider bargain on activity (stage
2).5 We solve by backward induction. For a given price p, the bargained




B(y) ￿ py ￿ V
￿￿ ￿
py ￿ C(y) ￿ U
￿1￿￿ (1)




(By ￿ p) =
1 ￿ ￿
e U
(Cy ￿ p) (2)
4The Nash bargaining solution has been used extensively in labour economics to exam-
ine negotiations between trade unions and ￿rms with respect to wages and employment.
See, for example, Oswald (1985) for a survey of the literature, and Manning (1987), Mc-
Donald and Solow (1981), Sampson (1993) and Bulkley and Myles (1997).
5A di⁄erent interpretation is that the Department of Health ￿xes the price, then the
Health Authority and provider bargain on activity. The implicit assumption is that the
Department of Health and the Health Authority share the same objective function.
11(See appendix 7.1 for proof). To interpret the optimal condition on the
bargained activity it is useful to distinguish two cases, low price and high
price (see Figure 1). 1) If the exogenous price p is low (By(ya) > p and
Cy(ya) > p), the desired activity for the purchaser is higher than the de-
sired activity for the provider. The bargained activity lies somewhere be-
tween the desired activity of the two parties. The LHS of Eq.(2) is the net
marginal bene￿t of activity for the purchaser, weighted by her utility and
her bargaining power. The RHS is the net marginal cost for the provider,
also weighted by his utility and his bargaining power. 2) If the exogenous
price p is high (p > By(ya) and p > Cy(ya)), the desired activity for the
purchaser is lower than the desired activity for the provider. The FOC can
be rewritten as
￿
e V (p ￿ By) =
1￿￿
e U (p ￿ Cy). Again, the bargained activity
lies between the desired activity of the two parties.
Figure 1 illustrates di⁄erent bargained activity levels (ya(p)) for three
di⁄erent values of the bargaining power of the purchaser, equal to 0.3, 0.5
and 0.7 respectively. In equilibrium it is always the case that e U ￿ 0 and
e V ￿ 0, so that the equilibrium lies in the area between the average and
marginal bene￿t, and the area between the average and marginal cost.
[Figure 1]
Finally if p = By(ya) = Cy(ya) (i.e. where the marginal bene￿t curve
crosses the marginal cost curve), there is no disagreement between purchaser
and provider, so that ya is such that By = Cy.




e V e U(￿￿) .
If the price is low, a higher bargaining power of the purchaser increases ac-
tivity (
@ya
@￿ > 0). If the price is high it reduces activity (
@ya
@￿ < 0).














which in general is indeterminate. According to our assumptions, it is always
the case that Cy > C=y and B=y > By, since the marginal cost is higher
than the average cost, and the average bene￿t is higher than the marginal
bene￿t. For low levels of p the provider utility e U is low (and the purchaser
utility e V is high) so that
@ya
@p > 0. Similarly, for high levels of p the purchaser
utility e V is low (and the provider utility e U is high) so that
@ya
@p < 0 for low
p. This result is consistent with the example shown in Figure 1.
The above analysis holds for a given price. The purchaser chooses the
price to maximize:
max
p B(ya(p)) ￿ pya(p) (4)
The FOC is:
pa : Byyp = y + pyp (5)
The optimal price is determined such that the marginal bene￿t of higher
activity equals the marginal cost. The SOC is: Byyy2
p +Byypp ￿2yp ￿pypp.
Dividing both terms of Eq.(5) by yp, straightforward manipulations lead to










p = ypp=y is the elasticity of activity with respect to price. The
optimal price is such that the marginal bene￿t from activity is equal to the
price, weighted by inverse of the elasticity of activity with respect to price:
a higher elasticity implies a lower marginal cost from an increase in price,
as intuitive.
132.2 Price bargaining
In the second scenario, we assume that ￿rst the purchaser and the provider
bargain on price (stage 1), then the activity is chosen unilaterally by the
provider (stage 2).6 By backward induction, for a given price the hospital
chooses the level of activity, which maximises U = py￿C(y), leading to the
FOC:




Cyy > 0 and
@2yp
@p2 = 0 (the SOC is ￿Cyy < 0). The bargained




B(yp(p)) ￿ pyp(p) ￿ V
￿￿ ￿
pyp(p) ￿ C(yp(p)) ￿ U
￿1￿￿ (7)












(See appendix 7.1 for proof). The LHS of Eq.(8) is the marginal bene-
￿t of a higher price, and includes the marginal bene￿t for the purchaser of
higher activity (weighted by her bargaining power, her utility and the re-
sponsiveness of supply) and the marginal bene￿t for the provider of a higher
surplus (also weighted by his bargaining power and utility). The RHS is the
marginal cost for the purchaser of a higher price and overall transfer (also
weighted).
If the purchaser holds all the bargaining power (￿ = 1), the optimal price
is such that: Byyp = y + pyp. If the provider holds all the bargaining power
6This setup is analogous to the model of bargaining between a ￿rm and a union over
wage and employment (McDonald and Solow, 1981; Manning, 1987), where the ￿rm sets
the employment, but the wage is bargained with the union.
14(￿ = 0), the optimal price is the highest possible compatible with the pur-
chaser having a non-negative utility. The bargained price is an intermediate
level between these two extremes.
2.3 E¢ cient bargaining
In the third scenario, purchaser and provider bargain simultaneously on
activity and price. This setting is called e¢ cient bargaining, because it





B(y) ￿ py ￿ V
￿￿ ￿
py ￿ C(y) ￿ U
￿1￿￿ (9)
After obtaining the FOCs and rearranging, we obtain:
ye : By = Cy (10)





(See appendix 7.1 for proof). The negotiated level of activity maximises
the sum of the surplus for the purchaser and for the provider U + V =
B(y) ￿ C(y). In this respect the level of activity is e¢ cient. The optimal
price is a weighted average of the average cost of the provider and the average
bene￿t for the patients.8 If the purchaser holds all the bargaining power
(￿ = 1), the price is equal to the average cost: the purchaser extracts all the
7The outcome achieved in price bargaining is not e¢ cient. As remarked by Aronsson,
Lofgren and Wikstrom (1993), "there are unexplored pro￿ts and/or utility gains from
bargaining".
8This result is in line with the model of employment-wage bargaining analysed by
Manning (1987) in the context of ￿rm-union negotiations. The level of employment does
not depend on the payo⁄s of ￿rm and union. Consequently, they "can agree on this level
and then bargain about the distribution of the rents" (Manning, 1987, p.131).
15surplus from the provider. If the provider holds all the bargaining power
(￿ = 0), the price is equal to the average bene￿t: the provider extracts all
the surplus from the purchaser.
3 Regime comparison
3.1 Constant marginal bene￿t
To gain some insights into how the di⁄erent scenarios relate to each other,
we consider the following functional forms: a) the bene￿t function is linear
in activity: B(y) = ay; b) the cost function is quadratic: C(y) = c
2y2 with
Cy = cy; c) the outside options are normalised to zero (V = U = 0).
The equilibrium for the three scenarios is reported in Table 1 (See ap-
pendix 7.2 for proof).
Table 1. Equilibrium with constant marginal bene￿t










2c ye = a
c
V a= a2
2c(2￿￿) V p = ￿
a2(2￿￿)










The following proposition compares prices, activity and utility under
di⁄erent regimes.
Proposition 1 (a) pe = pp ￿ pa; (b) ye ￿ fyp;yag, yp ￿ ya if ￿ ￿ 0:59;
(c) V a ￿ V e ￿ V p; (d) Up ￿ Ue ￿ Ua.
(See appendix 7.2 for proof). The price in e¢ cient bargaining is equal
to the price in price bargaining, which is higher than or equal to the price
16in activity bargaining. The activity in e¢ cient bargaining is the highest.
The activity in price bargaining is higher than in activity bargaining when
the bargaining power of the purchaser is below 0.59.
The purchaser weakly prefers activity bargaining to e¢ cient bargaining,
and e¢ cient bargaining to price bargaining. The provider weakly prefers
price bargaining to e¢ cient bargaining, and prefers e¢ cient bargaining to
activity bargaining.
In summary, the purchaser is better o⁄ in activity bargaining and the
provider is better o⁄ in price bargaining. Activity is highest in e¢ cient
bargaining and prices are highest in e¢ cient or price bargaining.
Figure 2 below displays the solution under di⁄erent regimes. An arrow
indicates increasing bargaining power of the purchaser. In e¢ cient bar-
gaining, a higher bargaining power of the purchaser reduces prices but has
no e⁄ect on the level of activity. In activity bargaining, higher bargaining
power of the purchaser induces higher activity, but has no e⁄ect on prices.
In price bargaining, higher bargaining power of the purchaser reduces both
prices and activity.
Interestingly, the solution in price bargaining, where the purchaser holds
all the bargaining power, coincides with the solution in activity bargaining,
where the provider has all the bargaining power (point A). The solutions
in price and e¢ cient bargaining coincide when the provider holds all the
bargaining power (point B). The solutions in activity and e¢ cient bargain-
ing coincide when the purchaser holds all the bargaining power (point C).
Finally, the activity in price bargaining is higher than in activity bargaining
only for low bargaining power of the purchaser.
Figure 2 also compares the solution when both parties have the same
bargaining power (￿ = 0:5). Prices are higher in e¢ cient and price bargain-
17ing (points E￿=0:5 and P￿=0:5 respectively). Activity is highest in e¢ cient
bargaining and lowest in activity bargaining (point A￿=0:5).
[Figure 2]
3.2 Decreasing marginal bene￿t
We extend the previous analysis, and assume a more general speci￿cation
of the bene￿t function: B(y) = ay ￿ b
2y2, with decreasing marginal bene￿t,
while we maintain the other assumptions: C(y) = c
2y2, V = U = 0. Table
2 reports the solution in price and e¢ cient bargaining. Proofs are in the
appendix 7.3. The solution for activity bargaining is more involved, and is
derived separately in section 3.2.1.
Table 2. Equilibrium with decreasing marginal bene￿t




















The following proposition compares the two regimes.
Proposition 2 If ￿ > b
b+c, then (a) pp > pe, (b) ye > yp, (c) Up > Ue, (d)
V e > V p.
If the bargaining power of the purchaser is su¢ ciently high (￿ > b
b+c)
prices are higher in price bargaining, activity is lower, the provider is better
o⁄ and the purchaser is worse o⁄ than under e¢ cient bargaining. If the
bargaining power of the purchaser is su¢ ciently low (￿ < b
b+c) all the results
18are reversed. The threshold b
b+c increases with b and decreases with c. Note
that if b = 0 we are back to the results of proposition 1. Therefore, if
the purchaser has low bargaining power, e¢ cient bargaining yields a lower
utility for the purchaser than in price bargaining. This is a surprising result:
we would expect the purchaser to be better o⁄ when she can bargain with
more instruments, ie both prices and activity. But this holds true only if
her bargaining power is high. If her bargaining power is low, having more
instruments is counterproductive. The purchaser is better o⁄ when she
cannot bargain on activity.
Figure 3 below displays the solution under the two regimes. The solutions
in e¢ cient and price bargaining are depicted by line BC and AD respectively.
An arrow indicates increasing bargaining power of the purchaser. As before,
in e¢ cient bargaining activity is constant, irrespective of the distribution
of bargaining power, and the price decreases as the bargaining power of the
purchaser increases. In price bargaining, both prices and activity decrease
as the bargaining power of the purchaser increases.
It is useful to compare these results with those obtained in the previous
section by assuming constant marginal bene￿t. When the bargaining power
of the purchaser is low, the activity in e¢ cient bargaining is lower than in
price bargaining but with constant marginal bene￿t it is always higher.
If the marginal bene￿t is constant (and equal to the average bene￿t),
the purchaser is always better o⁄ regardless of its bargaining power, be-
cause activity is always higher under e¢ cient bargaining than under price
bargaining, while the price is the same. Activity under e¢ cient bargaining
is always determined such that the marginal bene￿t is equal to the mar-
ginal cost. If the marginal bene￿t is strictly decreasing and the purchaser
has low bargaining power, activity under price bargaining can be such that
19the marginal bene￿t is below the marginal cost (so that activity is higher
than under e¢ cient bargaining) but the average bene￿t is above the price,
so that the purchaser￿ s utility is positive. If the marginal (and average)
bene￿t is constant, and the marginal bene￿t is below the cost, then the
average bene￿t will be below the price, which implies a negative utility of
the purchaser, which can never arise under Nash Bargaining as both parties
always have positive utilities in equilibrium. Therefore, the activity under
price bargaining will be always lower than under e¢ cient bargaining if the
marginal bene￿t is constant.
[Figure 3]
3.2.1 Decreasing marginal bene￿t and activity bargaining
In this section we derive the solution in activity bargaining. For a given















￿ 2bcp(a ￿ p)
bc
(12)
See appendix 7.4 for the proof. The optimal price is given by the price
which maximises V = aya (p) ￿ b
2ya (p)
2 ￿ pya (p). Given the complexity
of the solution, it is not possible to derive manageable expressions for price
and activity. To compare the solutions for the three scenarios we resort
to numerical simulations. Our strategy is to specify a grid of values for
all the parameters of the model (a, b, c and ￿), and compute the solution
numerically. We ￿x a = 1, and specify a grid for b 2 f0;0:5;1;1:5;:::;30g,
c = f0;0:5;1;1:5;:::;30g and ￿ = f0;0:1;:::;0:9;1g.
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the solution of which is pa = 0:29 and ya = 0:36. Table 3 reports the solution
for a = b = c = 1 and ￿ = f0;0:1;0:25;0:5;0:75;0:9;1g. The tables for the
other values of b and c are omitted, but are available from the authors.
Overall, the numerical simulations suggest that in activity bargaining
prices are lowest, the purchaser￿ s utility is highest and the provider￿ s utility
is lowest (note the similarity with proposition 1). Activity is lower than in
e¢ cient bargaining. It is lower than in price bargaining when the bargaining
power of the purchaser is below a certain threshold, which is between 0.7
and 0.95 in our simulations.
The solution in activity bargaining is displayed in Figure 3, on the line
AC which was derived by plotting the numerical solution a thousand times.
In contrast to the solution with constant marginal bene￿t, in activity bar-
gaining the price is not ￿xed any longer. As the bargaining power of the
purchaser increases, the price decreases and activity increases.
As in the previous section, the solution in price bargaining with ￿ = 1
coincides with activity bargaining when ￿ = 0 (point A), and the solution in
activity and e¢ cient bargaining coincide when ￿ = 1 (point C). However,
when ￿ = 0 (points B and D) e¢ cient and price bargaining yield di⁄erent
solutions. Finally, when both parties have the same bargaining power, the
solutions in e¢ cient bargaining and price bargaining coincide at the point
where marginal cost equals marginal bene￿t.
Finally, in price bargaining an increase in the bargaining power of the
purchaser reduces prices and activity, but in activity bargaining it reduces
21prices but increases activity.
Table 3: Numerical simulation of equilibrium with decreasing marginal bene￿t
Simulation based on the parameters a = 1;b = 1;c = 1
￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:1 ￿ = 0:25 ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 0:75 ￿ = 0:9 ￿ = 1
ya 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.50
ye 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
yp 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.33
pa 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.25
pe 0.75 0.70 0.63 0.50 0.38 0.30 0.25
pp 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.33
V a 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.25
V e 0 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.25
V p 0 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.17
Ua 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0
Ue 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.03 0
Up 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.06
4 Adding quality and e⁄ort
In this section we extend the model by introducing quality and cost contain-
ment e⁄ort, and we show that the results using this more general speci￿ca-
tion are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained above. We follow the ap-
proach suggested by Ma (1994) and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998b). De-
￿ne q as the quality generated by the provider and e as the cost-containment
e⁄ort. The cost function of the provider is C(y;q;e)+’(y;q;e). C includes
the monetary cost, which increases with quality and activity but decreases
22with e⁄ort: C(y;q;e), with Cy > 0;Cq > 0 and Ce < 0. ’ is the non-
monetary cost, or disutility, which increases with activity, quality and e⁄ort:
’(y;q;e), with ’y > 0;’q > 0 and ’e > 0.
We also assume that the demand for treatment depends positively on
quality so that y = y(q) with yq > 0. This assumption implies y = y(q)
, q = q(y); qy > 0. Therefore by contracting activity the purchaser can
implicitly contract the level of quality. The bene￿t function of the patients
is B = B(y;q) with By > 0 and Bq > 0. Since quality is a positive function





@y > 0. The
provider￿ s utility is given by the surplus: U = py￿C(y;q(y);e)￿’(y;q(y);e).
The purchaser￿ s utility is V = B(y;q(y)) ￿ py.
4.1 Activity bargaining
We assume that ￿rst, the purchaser sets the price (stage 1); second, the
purchaser and provider bargain on activity (stage 2); third, the provider
chooses e⁄ort (stage 3). We solve by backward induction. For a given price
and activity (stage 3), the provider maximises the surplus U with respect
to e⁄ort so that:
Ue (e￿) = 0 : ￿Ce(y;q(y);e￿) = ’e(y;q(y);e￿) (13)
The optimal e⁄ort for the provider e￿(y) is such that the marginal bene￿t
of lower cost is equal to the marginal disutility of e⁄ort. The indirect utility
function of the provider is U(p;y;q(y);e￿(y)) = py ￿ C(y;q(y);e￿(y)) ￿
’(y;q(y);e￿(y)).
For a given price (stage 2), the activity bargaining problem between










By + Bqqy ￿ p
e V
= (1 ￿ ￿)
Cy + ’y + (Cq + ’q)qy ￿ p
e U
(15)
The volume of activity is such that the di⁄erence between the marginal
bene￿t and the price (weighted by the relevant factors) equals the di⁄erence
between the marginal cost and the price (also weighted by the relevant
factors). The condition is analogous to Eq.(2). However, the marginal
bene￿t and marginal cost also include the additional bene￿t and cost from
higher quality. The marginal cost includes both the monetary and non-
monetary cost.
In stage 1 the purchaser sets the price to maximise:
max
p B(ya(p);q(ya(p))) ￿ pya(p) (16)
The FOC is:
pa : Byyp + Bqqyyp = y + pyp (17)
The optimal price is such that the marginal bene￿t of higher activity
and quality induced by a higher price is equal to the marginal cost.
4.2 Price bargaining
First the purchaser and the provider bargain on price (stage 1), and then
the provider chooses the level of activity and cost-containment e⁄ort (stage
2). We solve by backward induction. For a given price (stage 2) the provider
maximises the surplus U with respect to activity and e⁄ort, so that:
Uy (y￿;e￿) = 0 : p = Cy + ’y + (Cq + ’q)qy (18)
Ue (y￿;e￿) = 0 : ￿ Ce = ’e (19)
24The provider chooses the level of activity which equates the price to the
marginal monetary and non-monetary cost. The marginal cost also takes
into account the indirect e⁄ect of activity caused by increased quality, which
is captured by the last term on the RHS. The optimal e⁄ort is such that the
marginal bene￿t of lower cost is equal to the marginal disutility of e⁄ort.
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(y + pyp) (21)
The optimal price is such that the weighted marginal bene￿t for the
purchaser of higher activity and quality, plus the weighted marginal bene￿t
for the provider in terms of higher surplus, is equal to the weighted marginal
cost for the purchaser.
4.3 E¢ cient bargaining
First the purchaser and the provider bargain on price and activity (stage
1), then the provider chooses the cost-containment e⁄ort (stage 2). By
backward induction, for a given activity and price (stage 2) the supplier
maximises the surplus U with respect to e⁄ort,
Ue (e￿) = 0 : ￿ Ce = ’e (22)
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ye : By + Bqqy = Cy + ’y + qy (Cq + ’q) (24)
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(25)
The price equals the weighted sum of the average bene￿t to the purchaser
and the average cost to the provider, which includes the non-monetary cost.
The optimal activity balances the purchaser￿ s marginal bene￿t with the
provider￿ s marginal cost.
4.4 Regime comparison
Suppose that the bene￿t and cost functions are separable in activity, quality










F is a ￿xed cost; c) ’(y;q;e) = ￿1
2 y2 + ￿2
2 q2 + ￿3
2 e2. ￿i, ￿i, ￿i and ￿ are all
positive parameters.
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2 ￿ ￿3e￿ and e￿ is such that ￿Ce = ’e.




















assume V = 0 and U = F +
￿3
2￿3.
Compare this formulation with section 3.2. It is straightforward that all
the results contained in that section also hold for the more general formula-
tion developed in section 4.
26Intuitively, since activity is an increasing function of quality, by choosing
or agreeing a certain level of activity, the provider also determines the level
of quality. Therefore, adding quality adds complexity to the model but does
not alter the main incentives. The only di⁄erence is that the marginal cost
is now interpreted as the marginal cost of activity and quality; similarly,
the marginal bene￿t includes the marginal bene￿t of activity and quality.
For what concerns e⁄ort, since the provider is residual claimant in all the
scenarios, e⁄ort is set such that marginal bene￿t from lower cost is equal
to the marginal disutility of e⁄ort, regardless of the speci￿c institutional
setting. Therefore, also adding this variable does not alter the main results
of the analysis.
5 Conclusions
Di⁄erent countries have di⁄erent institutional and bargaining settings for
purchasers and providers. They usually follow one of three scenarios: the
purchaser ￿rst sets the price (stage 1), and activity is then bargained be-
tween purchaser and provider (stage 2): activity bargaining; the price is ￿rst
bargained between purchaser and provider (stage 1), but activity is then cho-
sen unilaterally by the provider (stage 2): price bargaining; and price and
activity are bargained simultaneously between purchaser and provider: ef-
￿cient bargaining. We ￿nd that if the bargaining power of the purchaser
is low, e¢ cient bargaining leads to higher prices and provider￿ s utility, and
lower activity and purchaser￿ s utility, compared to price bargaining. This
result seems surprising, as one would expect the purchaser to be better o⁄
when she can bargain with more instruments, ie both price and activity.
However, this intuition holds true only if the bargaining power of the pur-
27chaser is high. If her bargaining power is low, having more instruments is
counterproductive. One policy implication is that purchasers with low bar-
gaining power may be better o⁄ if restricted to bargaining on prices only,
and not on price and activity. Future empirical work might quantify the
bargaining power of the purchaser and the provider in health care markets.
This might help governments to decide whether to encourage purchasers to
bargain on prices only, or on price and activity simultaneously.
The analysis also con￿rms the intuition that if purchasers can set prices
(activity bargaining), net consumer welfare (patient bene￿t, net of transfer
to the provider) is highest. This result holds for any level of bargaining
power of the purchaser. The analysis therefore supports policies such as
"payment by results" in the UK, where prices are ￿xed by the purchaser or
the regulator.
One less intuitive result is that by shifting from e¢ cient and price bar-
gaining (as in "cost and volume" or "sophisticated" contracts) to activity
bargaining (as in "payment by results"), the level of activity is likely to
decrease. More precisely, this study predicts that moving from e¢ cient to
activity bargaining will certainly reduce activity. This is in contrast to what
is normally thought, ie that "payment by results" will encourage activity.
When moving from price to activity bargaining, activity will decrease (in-
crease) if the bargaining power of the purchaser is low (high). These results
are consistent with recent empirical evidence (Farrar et al., 2006) which
shows that the introduction of "payment by results" in England did not
lead to any signi￿cant increase in activity. Further empirical work might
test whether policies such as "payment by results" are likely to increase or
decrease activity compared to previous policies.
Finally, most of the empirical work focuses on the e⁄ect of bargaining
28power on prices (Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2006). This study provides
clear predictions of the e⁄ect of the bargaining power on activity as well
as price. More precisely, under price bargaining a higher bargaining power
of the purchaser reduces activity; under activity bargaining it increases ac-
tivity; and under e¢ cient bargaining it has no e⁄ect on activity. Further
empirical work might test such predictions.
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327 Appendix
7.1 The model
Proof of Eq.(2). Activity bargaining. The result is obtained by
di⁄erentiating ￿ log
￿
B(y) ￿ py ￿ V
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)log
￿
py ￿ C(y) ￿ U
￿
with re-
spect to y. The Second Order Condition (SOC) is ￿ = ￿
ByyV ￿(By￿p)2
e V 2 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
Cyy e U+(p￿Cy)2
e U2 < 0, which is always satis￿ed.
Proof of Eq.(8). Price bargaining. By taking the log and di⁄erentiating
with respect to p we obtain ￿
Byyp￿y(p)￿pyp
e V +(1 ￿ ￿)
y(p)+pyp￿Cyyp
e U = 0. From
the FOC of the provider we know that p = Cy. By simplifying, we obtain:
￿
Byyp￿y(p)￿pyp
e V +(1 ￿ ￿)
y(p)
e U = 0. The SOC is ￿
￿ e U2((By￿p)yp￿y)2+(1￿￿)e V 2y2








e V e U yp.
Proof of Eq.(11). E¢ cient bargaining. De￿ne
￿ =
￿
B(y) ￿ py ￿ V
￿￿ ￿














py￿C(y)￿U = 0. From the ￿rst equation we obtain p =
￿[C(y)+U]+(1￿￿)[B(y)￿V]
y ,
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~ V 2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
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~ V 2 + (1 ￿ ￿)
Cyy ~ U
~ U2 > 0. All three
SOCs are always satis￿ed, since Byy ￿ 0.
337.2 Constant marginal bene￿t
Activity bargaining. pa = a
2, ya = a










2y)y = 0, from which y =
2p
c(2￿￿). The FOC for price is: 2a
c(2￿￿) ￿
4p
c(2￿￿) = 0, from which: pa = a
2 (the SOC is ￿
4p
c(2￿￿) < 0). The bargained
activity is therefore: ya = a
c(2￿￿). The utility of the purchaser and the
provider are: V a = (a ￿ p)y = a2








Price bargaining. pp =
a(2￿￿)
2 , yp =
a(2￿￿)
2c , V p =
￿a2(2￿￿)
4c , Up =
a2(2￿￿)2
8c .
Proof. Since y =
p
c with yp = 1

















= 0, which gives: pp =
a(2￿￿)








p2 (1 ￿ ￿) < 0). Hence yp =
a(2￿￿)
2c , V p =
(a ￿ p)y = ￿
a2(2￿￿)








E¢ cient bargaining. pe =
a(2￿￿)
2 , ye = a
c, V e =
￿a2
2c , Ue =
a2(1￿￿)
2c .
Proof. The FOC w.r.t. price implies: p = (1 ￿ ￿)a+￿ c
2y. The FOC w.r.t.
activity implies: ye = a
c. Therefore pe =
a(2￿￿)







y = (1 ￿ ￿) a2
2c.
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) pp =
a(2￿￿)
2 ￿ a
2 = pa if ￿ ￿ 1. (b) ya =
a
c(2￿￿) ￿ ye = a
c if a
c(2￿￿) ￿ a
c or ￿ ￿ 1; yp =
a(2￿￿)
2c ￿ ye = a
c if ￿ ￿ 0;
yp =
a(2￿￿)
2c ￿ ya = a




2c if 2￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ 1 ￿ 0 or ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
2 ￿ 0; V e =
￿a2
2c ￿ V p =
￿a2(2￿￿)
4c
if ￿ ￿ 0. (d) Up =
a2(2￿￿)2
8c ￿ Ue = a2
2c (1 ￿ ￿) if
(2￿￿)2
4 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) or
4 + ￿2 ￿ 4￿ ￿ 4 ￿ 4￿, or if ￿2 > 0; Ue = a2





2 ￿ 1, which is always the case, since 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
347.3 Decreasing marginal bene￿t
Price bargaining. pp =
ac(2￿￿)
b+2c , yp =
a(2￿￿)
b+2c , V p =
￿a2(2￿￿)
2(b+2c) , Up =
a2c(2￿￿)2
2(b+2c)2 .
Proof. Since y =
p
c with yp = 1












































b+2c . Hence yp =
a(2￿￿)
















E¢ cient bargaining. pe =
a((1￿￿)b+(2￿￿)c)
2(b+c) , ye = a










FOC w.r.t. activity implies: ye = a























b(c￿ + b￿ ￿ b) > 0 or ￿ > b
b+c. (b) ye > yp if a
b+c >
a(2￿￿)
b+2c or b + 2c ￿
(2 ￿ ￿)(b + c) > 0 or ￿ > b
















or (b + 2c) ￿ (b + c)(2 ￿ ￿) > 0 or ￿ > b
b+c.
7.4 Decreasing marginal bene￿t and activity bargaining
Proof. From FOC w.r.t. y we have ￿
(a￿by)￿p
ay￿ b
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Figure 3. Comparison of scenarios with decreasing marginal benefit
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